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WHAT IS FAIR? EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
David L. Dickinson and Jill Tiefenthaler

ABSTRACT

There has been growing interest within the economics discipline in the role of equity
concerns in the distribution of resources. This paper presents empirical evidence from a series of
controlled laboratory experiments where third-party decision-makers must allocate resources
between two individuals. The experimental results indicate that subjects view a wide range of
different allocations as the fair distribution of resources. However, regression analysis indicates
that both treatment effects and a few demographic variables explain some of this variation in
fairness concepts. Most significantly, decision-makers rewarded subjects who earned their
favorable positions and the gender of the decision-maker was an important predictor of the
allocation chosen.
JEL classification codes: D63, C91, ZOO

Key words: fairness, equity, experiments
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WHAT IS FAIR? EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE*
I.

Introduction
While economists have traditionally focused on efficiency, there has been a growing

interest within the discipline in the role of equity in the distribution of resources. Concerns about
fairness are present in many different economic environments, and the desire to achieve a "fair"
outcome has been offered as an explanation for many outcomes that do not support the
theoretical predictions of purely self-interested utility maximization. In fact, a growing body of
experimental evidence makes a strong case against the pure selfish rationality model as subjects
are consistently willing to exchange personal gain for a "fair" allocation. Ideas about fairness are
perhaps even more important when the decision-maker does not directly benefit from the
allocation. In such cases, the third party's notion of fairness is likely to completely determine the
allocation. Examples of such environments include conventional arbitration, the household
allocation of scarce resources, bankruptcy settlements, and estate division.
This paper presents empirical evidence from a series of controlled laboratory experiments
that fit the above-mentioned scenarios. It is the first set of experiments, to our knowledge, that
focus exclusively on individual preferences over payoffs to other individuals. The final cash
payoff of two individuals (recipients) in our experiments is determined by a decision-maker
whose cash payoff is independent of the allocation of scarce tokens. These tokens are inputs that
determine final cash payoffs to the recipients via differing payoff functions. Therefore, a simple
50-50 split of the tokens is not necessarily evident since this allocation would lead to different
final cash payoffs for the recipients (see Section III for more details on the design). Our design,
coupled with subject anonymity ensures that the decision-maker's notion of a fair allocation is
what determines the division of tokens.

*We thank Kellyn Smith for excellent assistance in both recruiting subjects and running the experiments.
Valuable comments are acknowledged from the participant in the Colgate UniversitylHamilton College seminar
series. We also thank Colgate University for funding the experiments for this study.

j

2

We explore how fairness perceptions may be affected by both context of the environment
as well as whether one recipient "merits" an advantageous position relative to the other recipient.
Additionally, we collect demographic information on each subject so that we can further
investigation any demographic as well as treatment determinants of fairness beliefs. Context (or
framing) and gender effects on perceptions of fairness have been previously explored in
bargaining and public goods environments. However, our focus solely on the third-party
preferences over payoffs of other individuals is novel and relevant to understanding at least a
great number of decisions made by judges, arbitrators, head-of-household allocators, department
managers, etc. Our collection of a larger range of demographic variables allows us to use
regression analysis to examine whether or not there is any systematic relationship between an
individual's fairness standard, her characteristics, and the context of the decision-making
environment.
Consistent with existing studies, our results indicate that the context of the scenario
matters. Shogren [1989] and Cooper et al. [1999], among others, note that context is an
important determinant of decision-making outcomes. Our experiments show that when an
otherwise generic division of tokens is framed as a division of an inheritance, an equal split of
the tokens is significantly more likely, while an equal final outcome for the recipients is less
likely. Also, when a subject earns the right to the more favorable payoff function (versus random
assignment) an equal final outcome allocation is significantly less likely. We also find that men
are significantly more likely to choose the allocation that maximizes total payoffs as are,
curiously enough, students who have taken more economics classes.
These results have numerous policy implications. That earning the right to a more
favorable position affects an outsider's perception of fairness would explain many courtroom
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dialogues. Put differently, if one can be cast as a victim who is undeserving of a less favorable
position, an outsider's perception of how to fairly treat the victim is more likely that of equal
outcomes-a topic of debate in perhaps most divorce settlements. Another implication stems
from our result that men are significantly more likely to choose the most efficient outcome.
Given this, men and women are likely to view the justice of court decisions, transfer policies,
and even the household distribution of resources differently. Lundgerg, and Pollak (1996) note
the widely accepted hypothesis that "kids-do-better" when women allocate resources versus
when men allocate resources in the marriage. While their reference is to whether or not kids or
adults receive more resources depending on who allocates (as opposed to different allocations
among children), the importance of the third-party allocation rule is highlighted by such
hypothesis.
It is important to note that while our experiments focus on decisions made by unaffected

third parties, they are applicable to many other situations. We purposely design our experiments
so that the decision-maker has nothing to gain from the allocation chosen in order to isolate the
fairness concept. However, fairness concepts that dominate in this scenario are also likely to be
important when the decision-maker has something at stake. Understanding the importance of
considerations for fairness in limiting self-interested behavior requires a basic understanding of
what people think is fair.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We briefly survey the relevant fairness
literature in Section 2. Section 3 of the paper outlines the experimental methodology used for
this study and discusses the demographic questionnaire. In Section 4, we present the results
from the experiments-we present both summary statistics as well as the regression results
examining the influence of treatment and demographic variables on the chosen allocations.

3
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Finally, in Section 5 we discuss what the results say about fairness considerations and suggest
some policy implications.

II.

Fairness in the Literature
What is fair? The theoretical literature on fairness has shown that there are many

potential fair allocations with each meeting a different set (but not all) of widely accepted axioms
(such as envy-freeness, anonymity, and Pareto optimality). The theoretical literature on fairness
makes it clear that in any situation there are many allocations that could be considered as fair.
However, which of these perceptions of fairness are actually held by real people? There is a
paucity of research on this subject. However, the general perception among researchers is that a
dominant fairness concept does not exist and fairness concepts differ widely with the context of
the situation and the individual. Konow [1996] argues that the dispersion in fairness concepts is
not that chaotic. His argument is that all people are influenced by the same three framing criteria
- accountability, altruism, and efficiency - when determining a fair allocation. The dispersion in
what people report as fair simply results because people weigh these criteria differently when
making their decisions.
Konow's "accountability principle" states that an unequal distribution is fair if the
individual with more has earned his superior position. However, that same distribution is not fair
if the individual with more was simply lucky. The notion that effort matters to people is
supported by the social psychology literature where the "contributions rule" is seen as an
important determinant of fairness. Konow's survey results support the accountability principle.
In addition, experimental evidence from Hoffman and Spitzer [1985], Guth [1988], Hoffman et
al [1994], and Burrows and Loomes [1994] support the notion that differential payoffs are seen
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as fair if linked to effort. Hochschild [1981] finds that effort is a key criterion in whether or not
government inter-household distribution policies are seen as fair by the American public. There
is much less evidence on the importance of need and efficiency in forming fairness
considerations. Need is offered as an important fairness criteria by the social psychology
literature. The "needs rule" implies that those at the bottom be brought up at the expense of
those at the top. Engle [1988] points out that need is likely to be a particularly important criteria
when an individual is severely constrained. Konow [1996] presents some evidence from his
survey that concerns for efficiency influence what people view as fair.
In addition to the importance of context, fairness concepts (or the weight given to the
three criteria proposed by Konow) may also differ across individuals. Culture, background, and
other personal characteristics may influence an individual's morals and values and, therefore, her
notion of fairness. Evidence from the interdisciplinary literature on fairness finds that gender,
education, and cultural background affect what an individual thinks is fair. Harbert and
Scandizzo [1982] find that education increases the likelihood that a mother splits resources
equally among her children. In reviews of the social psychology literature, Engle [1988], and
Engle and Nieves [1993] find that women are more likely to split resources equally than to
follow a contributions rule and that equal split is more likely to be the norm in noncapitalistic
cultures.
Experimental economics research has further substantiated such gender effects. Croson
and Buchan [1999] find that women reciprocate more than men in East Asian countries as well
as in the U.S. Eckel and Grossman [1998] survey numerous studies that have shown somewhat
mixed gender effects, but their result is that women are less selfish than men in double-
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anonymous (anonymous from counterpart and experimenter) dictator games. l Andreoni and
Vesterlund [1999] find that women are more likely to equalize payoffs whereas men are more
likely to maximize total payoffs. The weight of the evidence points towards women being more
interested than men in equalizing payoffs.
The existing research, however, focuses on fairness when decisions directly and
explicitly affect the decision-maker. Our study of third-party allocations is important not only to
address another class of decision-making environments, but also to remove the vested-interest
present in other allocation decisions. This is perhaps quite important in understanding an
individual's unbiased perception of what a fair allocation is.
Farmer and Tiefenthaler [1996] theoretically examine a third-party allocation problem of
parents' allocating food among their children. The authors point out the potential fairness
concepts that likely exist in this simple problem of dividing a single, perfectly divisible good.
Standard possibilities for fairness include equal split, proportional split, and equal loss of the
resource. Equal and proportional split refer to how the resource is divided among two parties,
either equally or in proportion to the individual' s needs, respectively. Equal loss applies when
two parties each make a claim for an item that cannot be simultaneously satisfied. It may then be
fair to give each party less than the original claim (i.e., a loss) to each party. For environments
where the allocated item is an intermediate good to the production of some final item of value,
we actually have six fairness possibilities to consider. Equal split, proportional split, and equal
loss can be applied to the allocation of outputs as well as inputs, as noted by Farmer and
Tiefenthaler. Children, for example, all require food inputs, but how they turn the food into

1 The dictator game involves a "dictator" choosing how an amount of money will be divided amongst himlherself
and the unfortunate nondictator.
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health varies and, therefore, children given equal amounts of food will have different health
outcomes. Is fairness then an equal plate of food or an equal final health outcome?

III.

Methodology

A. Experimental Design
The choice of controlled experimentation for our data generation stems from the
difficulties involved in finding an appropriate existing data set to study fairness concepts. While
much of the empirical interdisciplinary literature on fairness relies on survey data, economists
are skeptical of what people say when there are no consequences to their decisions. While
controlled experiments do not represent naturally occurring environments, such experiments are
still valid given that subjects are making real economic decisions. Additionally, there are
offsetting benefits to using experiments. With an appropriate experimental design we can
generate data tailored to our investigation of 3-party fairness allocations. The controlled nature
of the design means that decisions are made in an environment free of the confounding factors
that can affect the quality of data from field studies. Further, to the extent that our subjects
(college students) differ in their demographics, we can control for the personal characteristics of
our subjects through regression analysis. Finally, our experiments are a cost-effective way of
gathering data-we incur a per observation cost of about $11 in these experiments.
In order for our experimental design to capture the essential decision-making elements of
the 3-party allocation problem described in the introduction, we must have the following:
(1)

A decision-maker divides scarce resources between two beneficiaries.

(2)

The decision-maker's utility (associated with the decision) should depend only on
the allocation made. That is, no post-decision transfers occur. Beneficiaries'
utility depends on the amount of the resource received and their capacity to
convert resource inputs into final outcomes.

7
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(3)

Beneficiaries differ in their capacity to convert the resources into final (utility)
outcomes, and this capacity is private information among beneficiaries.

(4)

Beneficiaries know how the resources were allocated among them, but each
beneficiary does not know the final outcome of the other beneficiary.

(5)

The decision-maker knows that the beneficiaries will see how the resources were
allocated among them, and he also knows that each beneficiary will not know the
final outcome of the other beneficiary.

As such, what really elicits the decision-maker's concept of "fairness" is that he must unequally
divide the resources in order to equalize final outcomes. Each beneficiary, on the other hand,
only sees the resource allocation and not the final outcome of the other beneficiary (and the
decision-maker knows it).
Our experimental design consists of four distinct treatments. The separate treatments, to
be discussed shortly, are meant to explore different facets of the same basic decision-making
environment. The heart of each experiment (i.e., a session of a particular treatment) is that a
decision-maker makes a decision affecting the financial payoffs of two beneficiaries (Players B
and C). The decision-maker is asked to divide 60 hypothetical units between two beneficiaries.
The decision-maker is given a payoff table (see Appendix A) that shows how different
allocations generate different outcomes for the beneficiaries, and the decision-maker knows that
these outcomes are used to determine the experimental cash payoff for the beneficiaries. The
payoff tables are generated from the functions U=30fl-(.5fl)2+300 for Player B, and
U=80f2-.25f/ for Player C, where fi refers to units of the input allocated to the individual

(payoffs are truncated to be whole numbers). While derived from the health production function
of Farmer and Tiefenthaler (1995), our decision-maker has a finer grid for allocations than in
their paper-60 versus 30 tokens to allocate. We choose these payoff functions as the basis for
our experiments for two reasons: First, linear payoff functions would limit the number of
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fairness concepts we can identify from subject decisions. Secondly, potentially confused
subjects (ultimately less than 5%) are identifiable with these payoff functions as all allocations
giving less than 20 tokens to Player B are pareto inefficient-giving more to Player B increases
both beneficiaries' payoffs?
The decision-maker is paid a flat fee of $1 0 for participation in the experiment. So,
unlike most experiments where there is a mapping of decisions to one's own monetary payoff,
the only thing motivating the decision-maker's behavior is the knowledge that his decision
affects the payoff of each of the beneficiaries. In other words, the decision-maker's concept of
fairness determines the payoffs of the beneficiaries. 3
The decision-maker is informed that the beneficiaries are shown the division of inputs,
but the beneficiaries do not see the payoff table or the payoffs received by the other

Farmer and Tiefenthaler note that several of their alternative fairness concepts would have no meaning unless the
payoff functions reach a maximum. A quadratic function is therefore chosen as the simplest function to attain a
maximum. One drawback, however, of the chosen functions is that when Player Band C's payoffs are equalized, it
is also the allocation that maximizes Player C's payoffs. This may limit our ability to examine whether allocators
wish to equalize payoffs or merely maximize Player C's payoffs. Nevertheless, since players were all anonymous in
the experiment, we strongly believe that such allocations are payoff-equalizing allocations as opposed to trying to
maximize the payoff of an unknown individual. Besides, less than 2% of decisions maximize Player B' s payoff, and
so one would expect many more such allocations if individuals were somehow systematically trying to maximize
payoffs of Player B. The weight of the evidence suggests that allocators equalize beneficiaries' payoffs by intent
and not as a byproduct of attempting to maximize Player C's payoffs.
3 In actuality, we use several decision-makers for each beneficiary, but this is unknown to the subjects. The
existence of multiple decision-makers per set of beneficiaries is used to lower our per-observation experimental
costs and allow collection of a larger sample size. We strongly emphasize, however, that no deception is used in the
experiments, and the decision-makers are completely aware that the decision made will affect real cash payoffs of
the beneficiary. In fact, we purposefully avoid lying to the subjects and, as a result, we use and pay real beneficiaries
in these experiments even though they make no decisions. Each decision-maker is told that the decision made will
affect the cash payoffs of the beneficiaries that he/she is matched with. Nothing in the language of the instructions
informs the decision-maker (or insinuates) that more than one decision-maker' s decisions are used to determine the
experimental (cash) payoff to the beneficiaries. Since allocations lead to large payoff numbers (from 0 to 1200),
decision makers are told that an exchange rate will be applied to the experimental payoff number " ... to determine
the dollar payoff that you generate for Players Band C" (the beneficiaries). While the exchange rate is not
disclosed, it is stressed that each experimental payoff point is worth a certain amount of cash, and that a higher
(lower) payoff number represents more (less) cash to the beneficiary. The exact language of the instructions is
contained in Appendix B.
Finally, subjects could not deduce that there were multiple decision-makers per pair of beneficiaries as
subjects were seated so they were not facing each other during the experiment. Additionally, all subjects (including
beneficiaries) were given experimental instructions to read through and a questionnaire to complete, and so it was
never the case that the beneficiaries were "just sitting there" while others were reading and making decisions.
2
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beneficiaries.4 After all decision-makers make their allocations (our sessions usually involved
about 16 decision-makers at a time to economize on experimental time and costs), each
beneficiary is shown the input allocation of the decision-maker, his own outcome, the
experimental exchange rate, and his own monetary payoff. Beneficiary # 1 never knows the
outcome or the cash payoff to Beneficiary #2 (and vice versa). Rather, the only piece of
information that each beneficiary knows about the other is the input allocation decision of each
decision-maker. Note that the beneficiaries make no decisions in the experiment. Finally, all
subjects are paid in private and in cash at the end of the experiment.
Four distinct treatments are used to examine two separate issues. First, does the context
of the decision affect the fairness concept of the decision-maker? Secondly, when beneficiaries
earn or deserve their initial positions (i.e., the capacity to tum resources into final outcomes), do
decision-makers exhibit different fairness concepts? We implement these treatments by using
j

four different sets of instructions. 5
The first set of instructions utilizes neutral language. Units are "tokens", and outcomes
are "player payoffs". By doing this we create a generic environment where the experiment is
simply a decision to be made with no specific context. Decision-makers are also told that the
beneficiaries are randomly assigned. We call this treatment Generic/Random.
The second experiment refers to the decision-makers as "parents" and the beneficiaries as
"children". The allocation problem is for the parent to distribute 60 units of food (tokens in the
generic experiment) among two children and the outcomes are the children' s health. Children

The payoff table is not shown to the beneficiaries to identify those decision-makers who view an equal division of
inputs as fair even though the resulting payoffs would be unequal. In other words, if beneficiaries see the payoff
table, the decision maker then knows that the beneficiaries are aware that an unequal division of inputs is required to
equalize cash payoffs. Without seeing the payoff table, beneficiaries may perceive that same unequal division of the
inputs as unfair, and this may affect how decision-maker chooses to allocate the tokens.
5 All experimental instructions are available from the authors by request, and some are included in Appendix B.
4
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are still randomly assigned in this experiment. We refer to this treatment as Food/Random.
Notice that in both of the random treatments, the beneficiaries have not earned their respective
payoff functions. Food/Random is a framed version of the Generic-Random treatment.
Allocation decisions may be different if the decision-makers view the beneficiaries as
having earned the right to their position. As such we also use a neutral-language set of
instructions with non-random assignment of the two beneficiaries. Prior to assignment, the two
beneficiaries (who are randomly chosen from among all subjects) are given a five-question quiz.
The subject who scores higher on the quiz is designated as Player B, and the other is Player C. 6
Players A (the decision-makers) may view this particular environment as one in which Player B
earned the right to the more favorable payoff function. We call this treatment Generic/Earn.
The fourth treatment once again casts subjects as parents and children. The instructions
describe the problem as one of dividing an inheritance among two children, and children each
have a "wealth" payoff function. Child #1 is described as financially responsible, always having
made good financial decisions, whereas Child #2 is described as relatively worse-off financially,
and in that position due to poor financial decision-making in the past. We do this to recreate the
sense of potentially having "earned" the more preferred (wealth) payoff function. The actual
assignment of the children is done by our five-question quiz as in Generic/Earn. This treatment,
called Bequest/Earn, is therefore our framed version of Generic/Earn.
The 2x2 matrix below summarizes the full experimental design.
Design Matrix

6 To avoid a selection problem among subjects, we employ the procedure developed by Ball and Eckel (1998). Even
though the recipients make no decisions in the experiment, we create the quiz so that all answers are numeric, and
the fmal quiz score is merely the sum of all answers. As such, all subjects (Players A, B, and C) are told that the
subject (from Player Band C candidates) scoring highest on the quiz is Player B. Note, however, that this "highest
score" has nothing to do with intelligence, unbeknownst to the subjects.

11
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Earned Rights

Random Assignment

Framed Decision

Bequest/Earn

Food/Random

Non-Framed Decision

Generic/Earn

Generic/Random

Based on our earlier discussion of fairness concepts, we can establish several hypothesis
about subj ect behavior within the context of the experimental design. To start, we can note that,
while an equal division of the inputs would lead to a 30/30 allocation to Player B/Player C, the
allocation required to equalize final payoffs is 20/40-perhaps the most focal allocations
highlighted in Farmer and Tiefenthaler. 7 Without context and without earned rights to the
"better" payoff function of Player B, we expect a baseline allocation of 20/40 since it generated
equal payoffs to both subjects. Our context hypothesis is that the context oft~e decision-making
environment will affect allocations. To be more specific, we need to talk of a particular context.
J

Based on results from the bequest literature, for example, our context involving inheritance
divisions would more likely lead to an equal division of the inputs. Our earned-rights hypothesis
is that allocators will favor the individual having earned the right to be Player B. A focal
possibility is that 30/30 allocations are more likely. More loosely, we expect an allocation of
greater than 20 tokens to Player B to be more likely. Our collection of demographic information
will also allow us to explore whether or not any systematic affects on allocations are the result of
subject demographic differencts.
Our experiments were conducted at Colgate University during the Fall 1998 and Spring
1999 semesters. Our subjects were undergraduate students recruited from a wide variety of

7 The other fairness concepts from Farmer and Tiefenthaler are as follows: Proportional split of inputs=36/24;
Equal loss of inputs=40120; Proportional output (rounded to the nearest allocation)=35/25; Equal loss of output
(rounded to the nearest allocation)=37/23. We anticipate these allocations being less obvious to the subjects due to
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courses. We attempted to elicit as wide a subject pool as possible within the limitations of the
university, and we specifically limited the extent to which we recruited subjects from economics
courses. 8 Total experimental costs were approximately $3 ,600 (including pilot experiments).
Decision-makers earned a flat fee of $10 for participation and beneficiaries received about $10
on average varying from a low of$8 to a high of$10.75. The experiments lasted approximately
25 minutes, and so the subjects were paid quite well relative to other earnings opportunities. We
gathered 314 total observations, and these were roughly equally divided among each of the four
treatments.

B. Demographic Data

In order to investigate the determinants of an individual's notion of fairness, we asked
each decision-maker to fill out a short demographic questionnaire (see Appendix B) after the
completion of the experiment. Each individual's questionnaire was matched to his allocation
using a numbering system. In a review of the social psychology literature, Engle (1988) notes
that the relevant fairness concept may depend on the resource being distributed as well as the
characteristics and values of the decision-maker. Therefore, regression analysis of the
determinants of the allocation chosen should include both treatment effects and some
demographic characteristics of the subjects as right-hand-side variables. Demographic
information was collected on gender, year in college, residence (regional and urban/rural),
college major, work status, receipt of financial aid, number of economics courses taken,

their more complicated calculation. The equal split of inputs=30/30 and equal output=20/40 allocations are simple
to calculate and therefore more likely to be used as simple rule-of-thumb allocations.
8 Economics is, however, one of the most popular majors at Colgate University. As such, many of the subjects
recruited from other courses may still list economics as their intended Major on our demographic questionnaire.
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attendance at religious services, race, number of siblings, performance of volunteer work, and
affiliation with a fraternity or sorority.

IV.

Results

A. Fairness Outcomes: What are the dominant choices?
Table 1 shows the summary data from our experiments. Decision-makers could choose
any token allocation from 0/60 to 6010 in one token increments, although Table 1 only shows the
allocations chosen at least once. Decision-makers chose a wide variety of different token
allocations. Column two shows the choices made across all treatment, and we see that thirty-two
of the possible sixty-one token allocations were chosen by at least one subject. However, three
allocations stand out as modal choices. If we refer to the beneficiaries as Players Band C
(Player C having the "better" payoff function), then the modal allocations of tokens to Player
B/Player Care 20/40, 30/30, and 34/26. The first two token divisions are, perhaps not
surprisingly, the equal (payoff) outcome and the equal split allocations, respectively. An
allocation of 20 tokens to Player B and 40 tokens to Player C gives both players the same payoff
because Players B and C have different payoff functions. An equal split of tokens (30/30) gives
Player C a higher payoff. Together these two allocations-the equalization of inputs and the
equalization of outcomes-account for over 60% of the allocations chosen for all treatments
combined.
Roughly 9% of the decision-makers chose the outcome 34126 that maximizes total
output. While this particular allocation is the most efficient (the most output is created from the
60 tokens), it gives Player B a greater share of the tokens and a greater final payoff than Player
C. In addition to these three obvious modal choices, ten subjects (3%) chose 40/20 as the fair
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TABLE 1
Frequency of subject choices (allocations chosen at least once are listed)

Tokens to
BITokens to C
0160
1159
10/50
13/47
14/46
15/45
18/42
19/41
20/40
21/39
22/38
23/37
24/36
25/35
26/34
27/33
28/32
29/31
30/30
31129
32/28
33/27
34/26
35/25
36/24
37/23
38/22
39/21
40/20
41/19
45/15
60/0
Total
Observations

Aggregate
Frequency
2 (.64)
1 (.32)
4 (1.27)
1 (.32)
1 (.32)
2 (.64)
2 (.64)
1 (.32)
139 (44.27)
2 (.64)
3 (.96)
3 (.96)
2 (.64)
6 (1.91)
2 (.64)
1 (.32)
9 (2.87)
5 (1.59)
52 (16.56)
5 (1.59)
9 (2.87)
7 (2.23)
28 (8.92)
5 (1.59)
1 (.32)
1 (.32)
2 (.64)
1 (.32)
10 (3.18)
1 (.32)
1 (.32)
5 (1.59)
314

Frequency by Treatment
GenlRandom Gen/Earn FoodIRandom
Freq (%)
Freq (%)
Freq (%)
1 (1.28)
1 (1.28)
2 (2.56)

1 (1.27)

---

-------

Beq/Earn
Freq (%)

----1 (1.28)

---

1 (1.27)
1 (1.27)

---

---

---

---

---

-------

--1 (1.27)
1 (1.27)
36 (45.57)
2 (2.53)

--1 (1.27)
--42 (53.16)
--2 (2.53)
1 (1.27)
1 (1.27)
3 (3 .80)
1 (1.27)
--1 (1.27)
2 (2.53)
5 (6.33)
1 (1.27)
6 (7.59)
2 (2.53)
6 (7.59)
2 (2.53)
-----

1 (1.28)
2 (2.56)

48 (61.54)

----2 (2.56)
1 (1.28)
-----

--2 (2.56)

--3 (3.85)
1 (1.28)

----9 (11.54)

----1 (1.28)
1 (1.28)

--2 (2.56)
1 (1.28)

--3 (3.85)
78
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------1 (1.27)
1 (1.27)
1 (1.27)
5 (6.33)
2 (2.53)
3 (3.80)
1 (1 .27)
2 (2.53)
4 (5.06)
8 (10.13)
2 (2.53)

----1 (1.27)
1 (1.27)
2 (2.53)

--1 (1.27)
1 (1.27)
79

----2 (2.53)
----1 (1.27)
79

----13 (16.67)

--1 (1.28)

----2 (2.56)
---

--1 (1.28)
1 (1.28)
41 (52.56)
2 (2.56)
1 (1.28)
1 (1.28)
5 (6.41)
1 (1.28)
1 (1.28)
---

----4(5.13)

------78

allocation of tokens. Given the payoff functions faced by decision-makers, this allocation
represents the fairness concept termed "equal loss of inputs" by Farmer and Tiefenthaler. Under
equal loss, tokens are distributed so that both beneficiaries lose an equal amount of the input as
compared to the input amount that would maximize each player's payoff.
Columns three through six of Table 1 shows the frequency of allocations broken down by
treatment. Even at the treatment level there is a wide variety of allocations chosen. However,
the variance of allocations chosen for each treatment is lower than that for the total sample.
Nine, 16, 13, and 12 different allocations were chosen in the Generic/Random, Generic/Earn,
Food/Random, and Bequest/Earn experiments, respectively. What is perhaps most interesting is

that the modal choice for three of the four treatments is the equal outcome allocation (20/40).
More than 50% of subjects chose an equal outcome in the two experiments where the recipients
were randomly assigned their payoff functions and 46% of subjects chose this allocation in the
generic experiment where recipients "earned" their functions. However, the modal choice for
the Bequest/Earn treatment is an equal split of inputs. More than half of the subjects in the
bequest/earn experiment chose an equal split of resources. This result is consistent with actual
bequest data. Data in both Menchik [1980] and The Royal Commission [1977] indicate that a
significant proportion of parents, though not all, split their bequests equally among their children.
The theoretical literature on fairness proposes that accountability or effort is an important
criteria considered by individuals trying to make a fair allocation. It is seen as fair for an
individual who earns a dominant position to enjoy the rewards. However, it is not seen as fair
for an individual to enjoy greater rewards if his dominant position was just lucky. Our results
join a few other empirical studies in support of this notion. In both experiments that framed
Player C as having been randomly assigned her superior payoff function, the majority of subjects
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thought that it was fair to generate equal final outcomes even though this implied an unequal
allocation of the inputs among Players Band C.

B. Regression Results

Given that notions of fairness differ across individuals, it is interesting to examine
whether or not this variation is in anyway systematic. Does the scenario influence the allocation
chosen? Do fairness concepts differ by gender or race? In order to estimate the determinants of
our subjects' allocations, regression analysis is performed. The dependent variable is coded as 1,
2, 3 or 0 representing the three modal choices (equal outcome, equal split, and maximum output)
and all other allocations, respectively. Several alternative specifications of the dependent
variable were tried and the results were robust across these specifications. 9 Given that the
dependent variable is qualitative and that the ordering of the fairness concepts is not important,
the appropriate estimation technique is multinomiallogit regression. The multinomiallogit
results are presented in Table 2. The marginal effect of each variable (evaluated at the sample
mean) is presented for each of the four categories. The model correctly predicted 57 percent of
the cases.
As expected, the treatment has a significant impact on the allocation chosen in several
cases. Relative to the Generic/Random experiment, an allocation of resources that results in

9 Six alternative specifications of the dependent variables were estimated. Initially the dependent variable was
coded from 0 to 5 with pareto inefficient allocations and equal loss (20,40) represented as separate categories.
However, all right-hand-side were insignificant in predicting the choice of these two categories and they were,
therefore, folded into the other category. None of the results for the three remaining modal choices were
significantly affected by this change. Another specification included allocations around the modal choices with the
modal choice categories. Again, this change in the dependent variable did not significantly alter the results.

17

equal outcomes is significantly less likely if the scenario is framed as if the recipients earned
their positions. In both the Generic/Earn experiment and the experiment framed as a parent
distributing her bequest among a productive and an unproductive child (Bequest/Earn), subjects
TABLE 2
Multinomial Logit Results (N=314)

Constant
Exp. #2 - Generic/Earn
Exp. #3 - Food/Random
Exp. #4 - BequestlEarn
Financial aid
Minority
Greek membership
Maj oring in a social science
Maj oring in a natural science
Number of siblings
Attends religious services
Urban
Rural
Works> 5 hours per week
Years at Colgate University
Male
Number of economics classes
Northeast
Volunteers
* Significant at the 10% level
** Significant at the 5% level

Equal Outcome
0.448**
-0.133*
-0.084
-0.435**
-0.008
-0.094
-0.117
0.053
-0.096
-0.001
0.028
0.045
-0.087
0.004
0.040*
-0.167**
-0.015*
0.006
-0.078

Equal Split
-0.069
-0.003
0.038
0.261 **
0.004
-0.053
0.049
-0.056
-0.105*
0.002
0.049
-0.025
0.047
0.019
-0.021
-0.039
0.020*
-0.087*
0.018

Maximum Output Other
-0.328*
-0.051
0.175*
-0.039
-0.037
0.084
-0.017
0.191*
-0.016
0.020
-0.009
0.156
-0.011
0.080
-0.019
.0.22
0.144
0.057
-0.004
0.002
-0.015
-0.063
-0.056
0.036
-0.035
0.075
-0.037
0.014
-0.036
0.017
0.074**
0.131 *
-0.026
0.021 **
-0.022
0.104
0.054
0.006

are less likely to view an equal final outcome as fair. This is in support of our earned-rights

hypothesis, and is consistent with existing research (e.g. Hoffman and Spitzer [1985], Guth
[1988], and Burrows and Loomes [1994]). An equal outcome is just as likely to be chosen when
the experiment is framed as a parent distributing food to her equally deserving children

(Food/Random) as in the Generic/Random case. Our context hypothesis is therefore met with
mixes results. Context, per se, may not affect allocations, but certain contexts-a division of
money, for example-may elicit different preferences for fairness than others. An equal split of
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resources was significantly more likely to be chosen in the bequest experiment than in the other
three cases. If the bequest experiment was used, the probability of equal split being chosen
increases by 26 percentage points. Maximum output was equally likely to be chosen across all
four treatments. However, allocations "other" than the modal choices were more likely in the
experiments where Player A earned his favorable position than in the two experiments where
assignment was random.
The results indicate that very few of the demographic variables are systematically related
to individuals' notions of fairness. This is an important result. While notions of fairness
obviously differ across individuals, it appears that standard demographic variables are not good
predictors of these differences. Most demographic variables do not appear to be good proxies for
the morals and values that determine an individual's fairness concept. However, there are a few
exceptions. Most notable, gender is a strong and significant predictor in most cases. In our
sample, 55% of the decision-makers are female and they are significantly more likely to choose
the allocation resulting in equal outcomes, while men are significantly more likely to choose the
allocation resulting in maximum output.
The result that the gender dummy variable is a significant predictor the fairness concept
chosen brought up the question of whether or not men and women responded to the treatment
effects in the same way. While data limitations prevent us from running the multinomial
regressions for men and women separately, Table 3 shows the fairness concepts chosen by
gender and treatment for comparison.
The frequencies in Table 3 suggest that men and women may view the importance of
merit differently when distributing resources. Most notably, when the generic experiment is
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changed from a random assignment of payoff functions for the beneficiaries to one where the
better payoff function is earned, men are much more likely to view an equal split of resources
TABLE 3
Frequency of subject choices by gender and treatment
Equal Outcomes
Men
Generic/Random
Generic/Earn
Food/Random
Bequest/Earn
Women
GenericlRandom
GenericlEarn
FoodlRandom
Bequest/Earn

Equal Split

Maximum Efficiency

Other

58%
44%
43%
13%

0%
35%
5%
50%

17%
5%
14%
6%

24%
16%
38%
31%

63%
58%
62%
20%

6%
3%
7%
54%

8%
3%
2%
7%

22%
36%
29%
20%

with unequal outcomes as fair. When the payoff functions were randomly assigned, no men
chose an equal split as the fair allocation. However, 35% chose equal split once merit was
introduced. The distinction between a random and merit-based assignment of payoff functions
had a smaller impact on women's choices. In fact, there was no significant difference in the
percentage of women who chose the three modal choices between the two experiments.
While we will not speculate on the explanations for these gender differences, we do point
out that the notion that women and men have systematically different ideas about what is fair has
dramatic policy implications. If they have different notions of fairness, women and men are
likely to view the justice of social transfers, court decisions, and family allocations of resources
very differently.
Another interesting result is that the number of economics courses taken has a significant
impact on the allocation chosen. Students who have taken economics courses are more likely to
choose an equal split of resources and an allocation that maximizes total output and are less
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likely to choose an allocation that equalizes outcomes. Specifically, a student who has taken 5
economics courses is 10% more likely to choose the equal split or maximum output outcomes.
Given all of the discussion in economics courses devoted to efficiency, it is perhaps satisfying as .
economists to see that students of economics are more focused on efficiency than are other
students. This result supports work by Whaples [1995] and Bianchi [1995] who both find that
economics training significantly affects an individual's idea of fairness. 10 Whaples finds that
taking an introductory course in economics increases the likelihood that a student regards the
functioning of the market as fair while Bianchi finds that subjects with economics training
behave closer to the selfish rationality model and place less importance on equality when
allocating resources. Whether this relationship is the result of economics training or simply a
selection issue is not completely clear. However, the causal role of economics trainingsupported at least in part by data reported in Frank et al [1993]-has some very interesting
implications. A few other variables have marginally significant impacts on the allocation
chosen. Subjects from the Northeast are less likely to choose equal split, older students are more
likely to prefer an equal outcome, and students majoring in a natural science are less likely to
split resources equally.

v.

Conclusions and Policy Implications
Economists recognize people's concerns for fairness as an explanation for a variety of

outcomes that are inconsistent with purely self-interested theoretical predictions. A goal of this
paper is to focus attention on an interesting and commonly occurring environment in which
perceptions of fairness playa particularly important role. Bankruptcy settlements, estate

0
1

Frank et al [1993] also fmd that economics training appears to limit individuals' willingness to cooperate in a
variety of dimensions.
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division, intra-household resource allocation, and conventional arbitration are all examples of
environments in which a decision-maker chooses an allocation of scarce resources that
determines a payoff for two typically heterogeneous individuals. The lack of field data that are
free from confounding factors has been at least partially responsible for the lack of empirical
work on fairness perceptions in such environments.
We have used controlled laboratory experimentation to identify the most relevant fairness
concepts and to study the effects of framing, earned status, and demographic characteristics on
perceived fairness. Fairness concepts differ significantly across individuals. Of the 60 possible
allocations in our experiments, 32 were chosen. The result is, in itself, significant. Researchers
must be careful when making conclusions about people's motivations in distributing resources.
Just because an individual chooses an allocation other than the one that the researcher thinks is
fair, does not mean that the individual has ulterior motives (for example, preference for one of
the individuals or self-interest). However, despite the dispersion in fairness concepts chosen, our
results do point to three dominate fairness concepts: (1) an equal split of resources that results in
unequal payoffs, (2) an unequal split of resources that results in equal outcomes, and (3) an
unequal split of resources that also results in unequal outcomes but does maximize the total
outcome. A resource allocation by the government or the courts that relies on one of these
methods is most likely to generate popular support.
However, the importance of the three modal choices changes with the framing of the
experiment. While an allocation that results in equal outcomes is chosen as the fairness concept
by a majority of subjects in the two experiments where the payoff functions are randomly
assigned, less than 50% chose this outcome when the payoff functions were "earned" within the
context of an inheritance division. In fact, the majority of subjects (53%) who participated in the
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experiment framed as a parent distributing her estate between a financially wise child and an
unwise child saw an equal allocation that results in unequal outcomes as the fair allocation. The
regression results highlight the significant differences that resulted when the experiment was
framed in this light. Holding other factors constant, decision-makers are 44 percentage points
less likely to allocate inputs to achieve equal final outcomes and 26 percentage points more
likely to split resources equally when the experiment is framed as a division of inheritance where
the target children earn their relative payoff functions.
The implications of this result are substantial. To summarize it, effort to achieve a
favorable position is rewarded by an outside decision-maker, whereas successfully portraying
"victim-status" results in an equal outcome allocation. The tenor of many courtroom arguments
is evidence that lawyers understand the importance of merit and luck in individuals' perceptions
of fairness. Council for criminal defendants claim that their clients are victims, those
representing plaintiffs in lawsuits represent their clients as simply unlucky, and attorneys for
those with "deep pockets" make sure that the jury knows how hard their clients have worked for
their superior positions. The importance of merit and luck are also considered in the legislative
process of making just laws. For example, debate over laws requiring an equal property
settlement following divorce often center on whether or not (typically) the wife should be
entitled to half of her husband's wealth. The issue is whether or not she really "deserves" half.
While existing research has shown a difference in men's versus women's perceptions of
fairness in environments where their own payoffs are at stake-for example, bargaining and
public goods environments-our research substantiates this difference even when own monetary
payoffs are independent of the allocation. Men are less likely than women to choose equal
outcomes but more likely to choose the most efficient outcome. In addition, descriptive analysis
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suggests that men are more influenced by whether or not an individual earned his favorable
position than women are. These results have dramatic implications for business practices, court
decisions, intrahousehold resource allocation, and government transfer policy. Men in positions
to allocate resources such as judges, legislators, fathers, and managers may be more likely to
allocate scarce resources in order to maximize efficiency. Women in the same positions may be
more inclined to divide resources in an effort to equalize outcomes across the affected
individuals. However, being male also increases the probability of choosing an allocation other
than the modal choices by 13 percentage points. This implies a higher variance of male
behavior, which may not be a very desirable quality in managers, judges or others in power. 11
Economics training may also determine an individual's perception of training. We find
that each additional economics course that an individual takes increases the probability of
choosing the most efficient outcome by 2%. Economists may make more efficient managers
(though not necessarily the most "fair" in the eyes of the workers), or in general may be more
likely to sacrifice other focal outcomes for the most efficient outcome. A male who has taken six
economics classes is 20 percentage points more likely to choose the most efficient allocation
than a woman with no exposure to economics is. It may be comforting to economists that our
students understand the importance of efficiency. However, it is important to recognize that the
most efficient outcome may not seem fair or acceptable to those without economics training. In
addition, the relationship between the number of economics courses taken and fairness
perceptions may be the result of selectivity rather than the training.
Hopefully, the results from these experiments will provide fuel for further discussion and
research. While the perception of whether or not individuals earned their positions mattered in
our results, our design is not capable of distinguishing between pure framing and the fact that a

11

This higher variance in male behavior is also shown in the dictator games studied in Andreoni and Vesterlund.

24

.J

story of an inheritance division was told. The fact that there is a significantly increased
probability that individuals would allocate inputs evenly in Bequest/Earn may have something to
do with bequests as opposed to merely any framed version of earned status. More study is
needed here to attribute this effect to one particular variable. Also, while we do capture some
determinants of behavior in our demographic variables, it is clear that what would be the most
obvious demographic controls (other than gender) predict only a small amount of allocation
behavior. An interesting extension of this study would use a more diverse subject pool to further
explore the effects of demographic variables on fairness notions. There is little variance in race,
age, educational status, or income in our subject pool. It would also be interesting to examine
the effects of living in a more capitalist versus a more socialist country on perceptions of
fairness. While more research is needed in this area, the results from our somewhat
homogeneous subject pool clearly indicate that people view fairness differently, and some of the
differences can be categorized. The policy implications of these simple results are vast, and so
uncovering the different determinants of fairness is a productive and necessary endeavor.
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VII. Appendix A - Player Payoff Tables

Payoffs given correspond to monetary payoffs to Player B and Player C

Tokens to
Player B

Tokens to
Player C

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

60
59
58
57
56
55
54
53
52
51
50
49
48
47
46
45
44
43
42
41
40
39
38
37
36
35
34
33
32

Total tokens
distributed
must equal 60
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Payoff to
Player B

Payoff to
Player C

300
329
359
387
416
443
471
497
524
549
575
599
624
647
671
693
716
737
759
779
800
819
839
857
876
893
911
927
944

600
619
638
655
672
687
702
715
728
739
750
759
768
775
782
787
792
795
798
799
800
799
798
795
792
787
782
775
768

Player Payoff Tables-continued
Payoffs given correspond to monetary payoffs to Player B and Player C

Tokens to
Player B

Tokens to
Player C

29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

31
30
29
28
27
26
25
24
23
22
21
20
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Total tokens
distributed
must equal 60

Payoff to
Player B

Payoff to
Player C

959
975
989
1004
1017
1031
1043
1056
1067
1079
1089
1100
1109
1119
1127
1136
1143
1151
1157
1164
1169
1175
1179
1184
1187
1191
1193
1196
1197
1199
1199
1200

759
750
739
728
715
702
687
672
655
638
619
600
579
558
535
512
487
462
435
408
379
350
319
288
255
222
187
152
115
78
39
0

Note: Payoff table shown reflects genenc language. Payoff table In framed treatment uses terms
like: "Units of Food (Inheritance)" and "Health (Wealth) Payoff' in place of "Tokens" and
"Payoff', respectively, in the table above.
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VIII. Appendix B - Experimental Instructions (for GenericlRandom and BequestlEarn)
and post-experiment Questionnaire
Generic instructions/random assignment of Players Band C
(bold type in instructions is in originals that subjects see)

This is an experiment in decision-making. There will be 3 different types of players in
today's experiment: Players A, B, and C. You will be a Player A for this experiment. As a
Player A, you will be paid $10 for your participation in this experiment. You will be asked to
make one decision in this experiment (it will be explained to you shortly). The decision that you
make in this experiment will not affect your $10 payoff at all. Your decision will, however,
affect the payoffs of the Player B and Player C that you are matched with.
You will be asked to allocate 60 tokens to 2 other players in this experiment, a Player B
and a Player C. The decision that you must make is how to allocate these 60 tokens between
players Band C. All 60 tokens must be allocated, but the precise way in which they are
allocated is completely up to you. You have been given a Payoff Table for Players Band C
which describes how different token allocations will determine the payoff that you generate for
Players Band C. Please look carefully at the similarities and differences in the payoffs for
Players Band C given different token allocations. For example, if you were to allocate 60
tokens to Player B and zero tokens to Player C, then the payoff you generate to Player B would
be 1200 and the payoff to Player C would be o. If you were to allocate zero tokens to Player B
and 60 tokens to Player C, then the payoff that you generate to Player B would be 300 and the
payoff to Player C would be 600. As a final example, if you were to allocate 13 tokens to Player
Band 47 tokens to Player C, then the payoff you generate to Player B would be 647 and the
payoff to Player C would be 775.
These payoff numbers do not represent dollar amounts, but they will be used to
determine the dollar payoff that you generate for Players Band C. After your decision has been
made, an exchange rate will be applied to each unit of payoff, and Players Band C will then be
paid in cash. In other words, each unit of payoff that a player (B or C) receives will be worth a
certain amount of cash to that player. It is important for you to realize that higher payoffs for a
player mean more money for that player and lower payoffs for a player mean less money
for that player.
After you have made your decision, Players Band C will get to see the number of tokens
allocated to each Player (B and C) (they will never know your identity, however). Further, the
Players Band C know that their monetary payoff will be determined in some way by these
allocations of tokens. But, Players Band C will never see the Payoff Table. Players Band C
will only be told how many tokens there were, and how these tokens were divided up between
Player B and Player C, and then Players Band C will each receive hislher monetary payoff in
private. Neither Player B nor C will know the actual monetary payoff of the other. Each Player
Band C will only know what the division of tokens is and hislher personal monetary payoff.
It is important for you to realize that two other individuals are assigned to be Player B
and Player C for you in this experiment. These individuals do not choose which Player they get
to be in the experiment, but rather it is randomly chosen which individual is Player B and which
is Player C.
(over)
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Your decision is only made once, and no one will know the identity of anyone else in the
experiment. Once you have completed your decision in the space below. A monitor will pick up
your decisions. You will then be asked to fill out a brief information sheet that will provide
valuable information to the researcher. This information will be kept anonymous and
confidential and will not affect your payment or future selection for any experiment in any way.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions! Otherwise, please make your allocation
decision now in the space below.

TOKENS ALLOCATED TOPLAYERB- - - - - - TOKENS ALLOCATED TO PLAYER C- - - - - - Thank you, and when all participants are ready, you will be handed a brief information sheet that
we would like for you to take a few minutes to fill out.
J
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Instructions framed as bequest decision/earned assignment of Players Band C
(bold type in instructions is in originals that subjects see)

This is an experiment in decision-making. There will be 3 different types of players in
today's experiment: a Parent, a Child # 1 and a Child #2 (child # 1 does not mean this is the
youngest or the oldest, we are just giving them a reference number). You will be a Parent for
this experiment. As a Parent, you will be paid $10 for your participation in this experiment.
You will be asked to make one decision in this experiment (it will be explained to you shortly).
The decision that you make in this experiment will not affect your $10 payoff at all. Your
decision will, however, affect the payoffs of the Child #1 and #2 that you are matched with.
Here is a brief history of Child #1 and Child #2.
Child #1 is in fairly good shape financially. Child #1 is an entrepreneur and works very
hard at what he/she does. As such, Child #1 wealthier at the moment, and better able to tum a
given amount of inheritance into more wealth (i.e., better investments, smarter investments,
smarter spending habits) than Child #2
Child #2 is not as well off at the moment as Child # 1. Child #2 is in this position because
of he/she has never worked as hard as Child #1, does not make investments as wisely, and is not
as good at controlling his/her spending. Child #2 has had all of the same opportunities as Child
#1 but has not made decisions as wisely.
In this experiment, we stated that two individuals are assigned to be your "children".
These individuals have taken a short quiz at the beginning of this experiment, and the
individual that scored the highest on the quiz is assigned to be the Child #1 with whom you
are matched (and the other one is Child #2).
Suppose that you are now faced with the decision of how to divide up your inheritance
between your two children. Specifically, you will be asked to allocate 60 units of inheritance to
the 2 children in this experiment. Think of each unit of inheritance as representing a certain
amount of money-60 units would represent the entire inheritance. The decision that you must
make is how to allocate these 60 units of inheritance between Child #1 and Child #2. All 60
units must be allocated, but the precise way in which they are allocated is completely up to you.
You have been given a Wealth Payoff Table for Child #1 and #2 which describes how different
inheritance allocations will determine the wealth each child will have. Please look carefully at
the similarities and differences in the wealth outcomes for Child # 1 and Child #2 given different
inheritance allocations. For example, if you were to allocate 60 units of inheritance to Child # 1
and zero units of inheritance to Child #2, then the wealth outcome for Child # 1 would be 1200
and the wealth outcome to Child #2 would be o. If you were to allocate zero units of inheritance
to Child # 1 and 60 units of inheritance to Child #2, then the wealth outcome for Child # 1 would
be 300 and the wealth outcome for Child #2 would be 600. As a final example, if you were to
allocate 13 units of inheritance to Child # 1 and 47 units of inheritance to Child #2, then the
wealth outcome for Child # 1 would be 647 and the wealth outcome for Child #2 would be 775.

(over)
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These wealth outcomes for Child # 1 and Child #2 will be used to determine the dollar
payoff that you generate for Child #1 and #2. After your decision has been made, an exchange
rate will be applied to each unit of wealth outcome, and Child # 1 and Child #2 will then be paid
in cash. In other words, each unit of wealth outcome that a child receives will be worth a certain
amount of cash to that child. It is important for you to realize that a higher wealth outcome for
a child means more money for that child and a lower wealth outcome for a child means less
money for that child.
After you have made your decision, Child# 1 and Child #2 will get to see the number of
units of inheritance allocated to each of your two children (they will never know your identity,
however). Further, the children know that their monetary payoff will be determined in some way
by these allocations of inheritance units. But, your children will never see the Wealth Payoff
Table. The children will only be told how many units of inheritance there were, and how these
units were divided up between Child #1 and Child #2, and then each child will receive his/her
monetary payoff in private. Neither child will know the actual monetary payoff of the other.
Each child will only know what the division of units of inheritance is and his/her personal
monetary payoff.
Your decision is only made once, and no one will know the identity of anyone else in the
experiment. Once you have completed your decision in the space below. A monitor will pick up
your decisions. You will then be asked to fill out a brief information sheet that will provide
valuable information to the researcher. This information will be kept anonymous and
confidential and will not affect your payment or future selection for any experiment in any way.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions! Otherwise, please make your allocation
decision now in the space below.

UNITS OF INHERITANCE ALLOCATED TO CHILD #1 - - - - - - UNITS OF INHERITANCE ALLOCATED TO CHILD #2 _ _ _ __

Thank you, and when all participants are ready, you will be handed a brief information sheet that
we would like for you to take a few minutes to fill out.
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Identification Number: - - Answer each of the following questions:
1. Sex: MALE FEMALE
2. Graduation year: 1999 2000 2001 2002
3. Region you are from: Northeast South Midwest West Foreign
4. What is your declared or anticipated major at Colgate? _ _ _ _ __
5. Location that best describes your home: RURAL URBAN SUBURBAN
6. During the academic year, do you have a regular (5 or more hours per week) job? YES NO
7. Do you regularly attend religious services? YES NO
8. How many economics courses have you taken at Colgate? _ _ _ __
9. Do you receive financial aid at Colgate? YES NO
If so, how much per year? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
If you don't know the exact amount, is it more or less than 50% of Colgate's annual cost?
MORE LESS
10. Race: WHITE BLACK ASIAN HISPANIC
11. How many siblings do you have? _ _ _ _ __
How many of your siblings are older than you are? _ _ _ __
12. Do you do some type of volunteer work on a monthly basis? YES NO
13. Are you a member of a fraternity or sorority? YES NO
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